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EXPERIENCE, MIND, AND THE CONCEPT

EXPERIENCE is an ambiguous word. It is used in so many different senses and with such diverse connotations, that we would not use it at all if another term were available. But we can not distinguish mind from other physical objects, except in terms of experience. Neither can we define the nature of the concept except in relation to experience. But to be intelligible we must first state what we mean by the word "experience." In defining our usage we are not trying to prove anything. If another believes, as we do not, that primary and secondary qualities have a different metaphysical status, or that there is something back of experience, which is not more experience, but is the substratum, or substance, or neumenon, of which experience is the phenomenon, he is welcome to his belief. Without stopping to argue or demonstrate, we only want to make our use of the word intelligible.

I. Experience

By experience we mean the sensuous qualities in that temporal and spatial structure that goes to make up nature. Experience consists of time-space just as much as of sense qualities. These qualities in time and space are independent of any and all experiencing subjects. In other words, the world is made up of sense qualities in space-time whether or not any organism is present to undergo the experience of those qualities. Of course, the experience can not enter into the life of any organism unless there be an organism so situated and so constituted as to undergo the experience. But the experience is one ingredient of the objective world in the sense that if an organism were rightly situated and constituted it would undergo the experience. What is there is that which yields such experience. And what yields such experience is precisely such experience. There is an identity of that which is experienced and the experience. There is nothing back of experience except more experience.

Of course, we can not know the world, made up of experience in time and space, merely by experiencing it. We must experience it, to be sure; but we must do more. We must use concepts in order to

refer beyond immediate experience. The nature of the concept and its use we shall consider a little later.

The forms of experience are not created by the mind. They are not imposed upon experience by a mind that has a stock of them on hand for schematizing experience. The objective world consists of formed experience prior to the operation of any mind, or any sense organ, although mind and sense organ are required to make us cognizant of such formed experience.

II. Mind

If physical nature and formed experience are identical, then what is mind? Mind is, first of all, a part of physical nature; but it is also more. Mind is physical nature plus. This something more emerges in spots throughout nature and is called mind or minds. Does all physical nature have in it that something more by virtue of which it is not only physical nature, but also mind? That is a metaphysical question into which we can not now enter, but we only mention it to say that the view of mind and nature here presented does not necessarily preclude the possibility of all nature being mind. But neither does it necessitate that view. In other words the problem of a world-mind can be treated on its own merits and is not involved in our definition of nature. If we so define nature as to involve a world-mind or God, we fall into a hopeless and vicious circle of reasoning whenever we attempt to investigate the object of religious experience.

What is this something more by which physical objects, without ceasing to be physical, become also mental? This something more is what makes life as well as mind. Life and mind are so closely connected that, for the present, we shall not try to separate them. There must be life in order to be mind, mind requiring a high degree of life in the sense of a very complex organization of organic responses and, what is perhaps a difference in kind, a progressive organization of responses. But just now we shall treat them together.

So our question becomes: What is life and mind?

The life of the organism is not merely its flesh and blood and other materials that enter into it, but a certain traffic which goes on between this flesh and blood and certain other objects past and present. Note especially that the objects are both past and present, for that is exceedingly important in distinguishing life and mind.

Physical objects interact on one another by way of many different media. They may interact through bodies of water, through vibrations of the air, through solid stone, through electro-magnetic fields and many other ways. But they can also interact on one another through the medium of an organism. Now life is this interaction of

physical bodies on one another through the medium of an organism. Notice that life is not merely interaction between the organism and its environment, although, of course, that is included, but it is interaction between physical bodies through the medium of an organism. In other words, life is not merely activities of an organism, because such activities taken by themselves are an abstraction. They are merely segments in a total process of interaction going on between physical bodies. The activities of the organism are but segments of motions transmitted from one body to another through the organism and other media. Of course, it must be remembered that motion, anywhere in nature, is the structure of certain sensory qualities. Motion is always a form of experience. But for brevity we must designate it merely as motion.

Now if we stopped with this there would be nothing to distinguish the living organism from any other transmitter of formed experience. It would be like any other medium of interaction between physical objects, itself a physical object. There would be nothing to distinguish the living organism from, say, an electro-magnetic field.

What is there distinctive about the transmission of motion from one physical object to another by way of an organism that makes such organic mediation qualitatively different from every other case of mediation? For it is this qualitative difference in type of mediation which constitutes life and mind.

The unique feature of organic mediation is that it learns. It forms habits. In other words, it brings the experience of the past to bear upon the present and the future. But let us not forget that all experience is physical. It enters into the constitution of some physical object. It is never *merely* mental. It may be mental, and it is precisely experience as mental that we are trying now to describe. But when mental it does not cease to be physical. A physical object becomes a participant in that total process called mind when the experience of which it is in part constituted is transmitted by way of an organism to some future object. Expressing it in still other language, mental interaction between physical bodies is by way of an organism which refers back to past objects and forward to future objects. Life and mind perpetuate through time the experience which constitutes past objects. In life and mind, but incomparably more in mind, experience with its time-space structure takes on an added form without losing its time-space structure. It rolls up, as it were, like a snowball or a spiral, so that the past is operative in the present and the future. As long as an object, continuing in its proper space-time as physical, can not reach over intervening space-time to an object of some other space-time and act immediately upon that remote object, we have physical nature

only. But when this overleaping of space-time occurs, we have life and mind. This overleaping of space-time does not mean in any sense the abrogation of space-time or the transcendence of it. It only means the addition to physical space-time of an added feature. It means that certain bits of experience begin to roll up like a snowball. As soon as the uniform flow of experience in the form of space-time throughout all nature begins to take on this added character we have the beginnings of life and mind.

The preceding paragraph can be summarized by saying that as soon as learning or habit formation appears in nature we have the emergence of life and mind. Our only difficulty has been to indicate just what is involved in that familiar event called learning or habit formation. Through the living organism objects that are past in time or remote in space, without ceasing to be past or remote, can act on objects that are present in time and near in space, after a fashion which does not occur elsewhere. In a nutshell, *when experience not only controls the behavior of objects directly, as it does constantly throughout nature, but also by referring to future and past objects, we have mind.*

Life and mind are not something apart from physical objects, but they are physical objects when physical objects begin to interact through the mediation of an organism in the way described. Physical objects become ingredients in life and mind when they begin to interact in this way. And there is no life and mind, so far as we know, which is not made up of physical objects after this fashion.

The theory is abroad that habit formation is not peculiar to life; that many other objects display it. If that be true, which we do not believe, then life would differ from these other habit-forming propensities only in degree. Our reasoning would still hold concerning the distinctive character of life, its differentia being, however, in such case, a matter of degree and not of kind. Life would still be unique in the degree to which learning was developed. We feel sure, however, that when habit formation is attributed to non-living physical objects there is confusion of thought and inadequate definition of habit, due, perhaps, to the strong desire on the part of some to preserve the continuity of nature in passing from the physical to the vital and mental. But if our definition of life be correct there is no break between the physical and the vital; there is only the emergence of a new quality. It is now becoming common to speak of mind as an emergent. We are trying to state a little more precisely what it is that emerges.

We can not go deeply into this matter of habit formation. But the crudest instances of so-called habit may be considered. It has

been said, for instance, that a coat forms habits as shown by the folds it assumes when worn for some time. But this is a wholly different matter. The folds are effects of past events to be sure, just as the stone that lies on the ground at a certain spot is the effect of past events. It would not be there were it not for past events, but it is not there because it has learned to hug the earth at that particular point. Nor has the balloon learned to float in the air. The stone sticks to the earth, and gradually settles deeper, because of tensions and motions (experience) which flow uniformly with time-space. The stone is not able to refer to past and future objects of experience and thus mediate interaction between the past and future. But this is precisely what life and mind do. And this is precisely what the coat does not do. The coat does not hold its folds because of past and future objects, but only because of tensions that are immediately operative in it at the present moment.

Kick a stone and it rolls over and is quiet, or if it continues to roll it is because of new tensions that come into play with the onward movement of time-space. The stone can not refer back to the kick in such manner that the kick continues with it through time. But that is just what a rabbit does. When you kick it, it runs for several hundred yards and then starts up again to run, all because of the kick. The kick, though past, is still something to which the rabbit can refer as an object and which, therefore, can still operate through the rabbit.

What is the device by which the living and thinking organism can designate objects that are past in time and remote in space? It is the symbol. It may scarcely be proper to say that unconscious organic processes use symbols, but it is certainly true that these organic activities interact with objects past and future and have something akin to the symbol. Even the lowest forms of vegetable life do this. But in the mind we find the use of symbols definitely developed. The word "orange" is a symbol which signifies a physical object. But how can such marks on paper or sound in the air symbolize any object so remote in character and, it may be, so remote in time and space, as a physical orange? Only because the mind has this unique feature of interacting with objects that are past. Does that mean that the physical orange is carried in some disembodied form in the mind and out of time and space? By no means. Our whole point is precisely that the physical orange is still physical and occupies that time and space which is physically proper to it. But while still thus remote in time and space it can be an object that acts through the organism on objects that are present or future.

III. The Concept

A concept is a symbol which serves to designate an object by reason of an associated system of habits. For instance, the word "snake," when ejaculated in a certain situation, is a concept because the sound, in that situation, is associated with a system of habits and this system gives the sound a significance, *i.e.*, renders the sound a signifier of something. If, in uttering the sound, one makes a certain quick movement, starts to one side, looks and points, the system of habits which give designative value to the sound are most pronounced. Of course, the habits which make the sound a designator of some form of experience may be purely verbal habits. The concept can not attain any high degree of refinement, accuracy, and scope of application until the habits are largely verbal. But it is the system of habits associated with the sound, the gesture, the mark or other sign, which makes it a pointer, designating some object. A concept, then, is a pointer indicating something not itself in the world of nature.

But what we have just described is not the only kind of concept nor the only use of the concept. Concepts are not only used to point out objects in nature; they are also used to designate other concepts. The system of habits associated with a word or sentence may not only serve to make it designative of some form of experience, but may also make it a pointer to other words or sentences which are also pointers. And these again may point on to still others. Thus one pointer (for every concept is a pointer) may indicate another, and this a third, and so we may pass from concept to concept without referring to nature. And this game may become so interesting, in fact is so interesting for many, that most of their time is devoted to marshalling battalions of concepts in serried ranks, devising new concepts and constructing ever more intricate combinations of concepts. They may do this until they forget there is a world of nature. In fact, thinkers of this type have become so absorbed in the game of concepts that they have actually asserted, and established a massive philosophic tradition to the effect, that the world of sense was less real (whatever that may mean) than the concepts; that sensory experience, and even space and time, are a transitory flux that pass like a dream, while only the concepts were sure and permanent, eternal in the heavens; or that the world of sense in space and time was derived from the concepts, or strives toward the concepts as an ideal; that the world of experience was a fleeting phantom while the concepts were the steel girders of reality.

There are, then, two uses of concepts: (1) to designate natural

objects and (2) to designate other concepts. But number (2) may be subdivided again, for there are two ways in which concepts may be used to designate and organize other concepts. One is called "mere imagination"; the other is called thinking. Imagination becomes thinking only when the transition from concept to concept is controlled. But controlled how? Here we stand face to face with logic and scientific method. We must give some consideration to both, first taking up logic in the strict and narrow sense as distinguished from methodology.

The logical categories do not enter into the structure of the world of nature. They are not categories of experience. They are simply the necessary rules which must be observed in the use of symbols. They are the constitutive principles, not of the world of nature, but of symbolism and the use of symbols. They have to do with the nature and uses of the concept, but have nothing to do with the natural world except indirectly as concepts are used to designate objects of that world and as symbols themselves are of nature. Just as we have laws or principles which enter into the constitution of language and its use, so we have principles which enter into the nature and use of any symbols whatsoever, whether they be language symbols or other kinds. Just as grammar is the study of the structure and requirements of that special kind of symbols called language, so logic, as a study, is the study of those more general and pervasive requirements to which all symbols whatsoever must conform if they are to be symbols at all. For instance, if x is used to symbolize a and the next moment b and then again c, and in each case the significance of x is changed arbitrarily at the caprice of the individual, x loses its symbolic value. It ceases to be intelligible. The one significance it has contradicts the other. Such arbitrary symbolism destroys itself. It is not only impossible to use such a symbol for communication, but also impossible to think with it. Such symbolism would be only the wildest kind of dreaming. Logical requirements, then, are the requirements of all symbols that enter into thinking. And since it is impossible to think without symbols, logical requirements are the requirements of all thinking.

IV. Three Kinds of Truth

What, then, is truth? Or what do we mean by a true concept? There are three senses in which we may use the word "truth."

First, there is the truth of the designating concept. A concept is true when the system of habits associated with a symbol are adapted to the object which it is used to designate. For instance, a certain sensory experience befalls me and I say: There is a cow.

The system of habits associated with the word "cow," when uttered in that situation, come into operation and I advance to milk the object. But I find the habits are not adapted to it. The object can not be milked. It is, after all, a bush in the twilight. But suppose my habits had been adapted to it and it was truly a cow. As an object, then, what is it? It is all that experience which ensues when the system of habits are carried to fullfilment. That is the object truly designated by the concept "cow." The concept is always a pointer, and the associated habits give point to the symbol.

If another organism, say a fly, were reacting to the cow, the experience constituting the cow would be different. Of course, it is probable that the fly never does react to that time-space structure of experience which we call cow, but to something very different. For instance, when resting on the cow's back or dodging the cow's tail, it probably is not reacting to the cow at all, any more than we would be if we were dodging the pebbles kicked down a cliff by an invisible cow. But supposing the fly did react to the cow. Its experience would be entirely different from mine. Which experience is the object called cow? Our answer is: Both. The cow in any given situation, with respect to any organism that may react to it, is the experience of a certain time-space structure.

If one may risk absurdity and speak of an absolute cow one might say that the cow is all that experience of a time-space structure (Alexander would say space-time plan) which any organism ever has had or ever will have when reacting to it. But the object designated by our ordinary concept, cow, is no such absolute or infinite system of experience as that. It is rather that order of experience undergone by the human type of organism in the conventional situations. Knowledge by acquaintance requires that we have some of that experience which constitutes the object; but the experience without the concept is not knowledge; and it is not necessary that we have the same experience in order to know the same object.

We have been considering truth in one sense. It might be called truth in the sense of true knowledge of natural objects. But there is another sense in which the word "truth" may be used. It is the truth of the logical category. Its truth does not lie in adaptation of a system of habits to an object of experience, because it does not apply directly to experience. A logical category is true if it is necessary to the constitution of symbols and to the preservation of the significance of a symbol through all the combinations and transitions of symbols which elaborate thought requires. This is a very different kind of truth from that which consists in the correct designation of an object in nature. It has to do with the constitution

of symbols as such, regardless of whether they are being used to designate some natural object or not. In other words, logic only sees to it that the symbol is fit to designate something; but the actual process of designating lies outside the field of logic in this strict and narrow sense. Logic must keep the tools sharp and bright, but it makes no use of the tools itself.

Methodology has to do with the use of the tools. And this brings us to the third sense which may be given to truth. First, we had truth in the sense of true knowledge, meaning the correct designation of an object in nature. Second, there was truth in the sense of the logical constitution and organization of symbols. Now, third, we have truth as a method or process of reaching true knowledge by using the tools prescribed by logic. There is truth in the sense of knowledge: there is truth in the sense of logically constituted symbolism; and there is truth in the sense of scientific inference as a process.

The difference between strict logic and scientific method might be illustrated by the case of the so-called law of thought that A can not be both A and not-A. As a law of strict logic it means that a symbol destroys its symbolic value if it designates both A and not-A. As a law of scientific method it means that one space-time is not another.[1]

V. Scientific Method

Putting it roughly, we may say that scientific method is a device by which we disencumber ourselves of the great mass of experience in order to pick our way through the intricate space-time structure of all experience. The quickest, easiest, and surest way to pass from one object to another in thinking, especially when one is dealing with a great number and variety of objects, is to ignore everything about the objects save their space-time structure and to consider only certain distinctive features of that. Now, of course, all the sense qualities of experience can not be ignored. We can not pick our way through the intricate structure of experience unless we have at least a few sense data to guide us. But science endeavors to reduce these data to the very minimum, or, at least, to those particular data which serve to guide us in making our inferences, but which may not give us any of the sensuous flavor and fulness of the experienced object. Science sifts out the great massive flood of experience, winnows it, and breaks it up until it discovers those rare and scattered bits of data which serve to guide inference through the maze of the time-space structure. These bits of experience called data which are thus selected by microscope and spectroscope, by

[1] See S. Alexander, *Space, Time and Deity*, p. 197.

mortar and acid and many other devices, these data are made to shine like jeweled lights at strategic points and critical turns of the space-time structure. But the world thus plotted and planned by science presents a wholly different aspect from that which is known by way of ordinary experience. The total concrete object, which can be known with some degree of accuracy as illustrated in the case of the cow, is not the object which engages the attention of the scientist. He has not time to deal with such a cumbersome mass of experience.

Let us illustrate. Science has a concept which designates not the experience of heat, but that motion called energy, or the space covered by the mercury in a thermometer. There is no particular resemblance between the rising and falling mercury and the experience of heat and cold. Science does not designate the experience of a falling body, but the ratio of motion which is the distinguishing feature of the space-time structure. It designates not light as experienced but the vibrations, which again is space-time structure. It designates not the experience of sound, but the vibrations of the air, *etc., etc.* So it is that science developes a technique for dispensing with the massive bulk of experience, dealing only with certain carefully selected data, the ultimate precipitate of analysis. All else is cast aside as irrelevant.

What we have said of science in general is just as true of psychology and sociology as it is of physics and chemistry. It is not so manifest in them partly because they are more complex, partly because they have not yet developed an adequate technique, and partly because they are so young that they are not yet thoroughly scientific in their thinking. We do not mean that all science must be reduced to the terms of physics and chemistry. On the contrary, we are very sure that each science must develop its own viewpoint, its own method and technique; and each must interpret the world in its own categories. But since all experience has the form of time and space, all science that studies experience (and science can study nothing else) must work out the complex time-space interrelations of those data of experience which it has selected as its own peculiar subject-matter.

Scientific method transforms the character of our experience because it transforms our habits of response. The stimuli that once aroused us no longer stir us in so far as we assume the scientific attitude, for the scientific attitude means to be responsive to certain rarified and selected data at certain loci in space-time. The massive bulk of experience is ignored. In so far as we are scientific the concrete object with all its savor and rich sensuous fulness and emotional stir is gone. It has disappeared like a bubble. Compare the world as

known and felt by the modern scientific man with the world of the primitive man as revealed in his folk lore. To be sure this latter world is full of fancy, illusion, error. But all this efflorescence of illusion and emotion springs from a rich concrete sensuous mass of experience which he has not learned to ignore. The child has it; the poet has it; the great originative scientist has it who breaks with the scientific tradition of his day and, like Darwin or Galileo, blazes new paths through the jungle of experience. But the established scientific technique does not have it and can not have it, because of its very nature.

Now the question we want to raise is this. Can any such vast and elaborate scientific technique, as we see developing in the civilized world of to-day as never before in history, exist in our midst without greatly transforming our appreciations, our habits of response, our capacity for growth, for joy, for fulness of life? Certainly a technique rapidly accumulating from generation to generation, and becoming ever more pervasive in shaping our habits, appreciations, and outlooks, can not be without effect. What effect will it have? The answer to that question has already been given. The effect it must have is revealed in the very nature of scientific methodology or technique. It impoverishes the world of experience. It destroys the capacity to appreciate the "surplusage" of experience. What does that mean? This surplusage of experience means all those data, and all that unanalyzed datum, which is irrelevant to our established scientific theories, but is indispensable to the development of any radically new theories and the solution of very different and more complex problems that are bound to arise with an evolving civilization. It means, furthermore, all that concrete, scientifically meaningless, experience which makes seven-eights of the joy of living—a lover's kiss, the colors of the sunset, a child's soft little hands, the heart of a rose.

Yes, but, you answer, our scientific technique has not destroyed in us the capacity to enjoy the bits of concrete experience just mentioned. Of course not. We could not illustrate our point with experiences we had ceased to appreciate. The only point is this: Does scientific technique have any effect upon human life? And, if so, what effect? It seems there can be but one answer. It vastly magnifies our efficiency in procuring anything we want and have the capacity to enjoy; but it greatly diminishes our capacity to enjoy. It gives us wonderful instruments of achievement, but narrows and distorts our vision of what is to be achieved.

But there is art and religion to correct this one-sided development of science. Exactly. The more science advances, the more elaborate, constraining, and pervasive its technique becomes, the more we re-

quire art, religion, and the personal intercourse of love to save our souls. But while science has advanced with leaps and bounds since the Middle Ages, since the days of Greece and Rome, since the days of Thor and Brunhilde, have art and religion kept pace with it? Are art and religion more or less pervasive throughout our life in comparison with those days? Is scientific technique more or less pervasive?

Are we asserting our case is hopeless? Not at all. We are simply pointing to what we believe is a manifest fact which must not be ignored and can be corrected if we face it. We must turn to the cultivation of art and, above all, religion for salvation. But how does religion correct the fatal distortion of life brought about through scientific method? That we must treat at some other time.

HENRY NELSON WIEMAN.

OCCIDENTAL COLLEGE.

THINGS PERCEIVED BUT NOT EXISTENT

A REJOINDER TO DR. MONTAGUE

IT is with no polemic purpose that I reply to Dr. Montague's discussion of my "Epistle to a Neo-realist"; rather with the sincere desire of coming to an understanding with him—a possibility which seems to me, in view of his remarks, not wholly out of the question. For he has not yet quite correctly understood my theory; and I am prepared to modify the statement of it, so as to remove all doubt as to the identity, in veridical perception, of things existent with things perceived. Moreover, I find premonitions of a possible agreement in his paper. He speaks of the cognized object that turns out to be non-existent as the "sunken rock" on which a realistic theory is likely to be wrecked. And, very open-mindedly, he regards it as an open question "whether the secondary qualities that appear to us do really exist outside the organism."

If they do not, I can see but two possibilities: they may be mere images "before the mind," objective in their character, necessarily produced in us by the action of the objects to which they are attributed, and conveying some truth about these objects in a symbolic form, but not existent, either in the brain or outside it; or, if there is any existent concerned, it must be in the brain, and, so to speak, misplaced—that is, falsely "projected" outside into objects. Now my theory combines both these possibilities. I hold that there is in the brain (constituting its inner being) something of a sensuous nature, not identical with the secondary quality, but closely corresponding to it, which I ask leave to call *the existent image;* and that in perception this image is used as a sign of the outer object, and so

becomes *objectified,* projected, or seemingly conveyed outside, in the form of the secondary quality, which latter is a mere apparition. And I ask Dr. Montague, not to accept this theory, but to consider it as a possibility, and see whether it does not satisfactorily solve all the difficulties about error, down to and including the perception of objects that do not exist.[1]

I need not, however, ask him to consider this possibility, for he has already done so. After suggesting that secondary qualities may not exist in external objects, and that the qualities, therefore, which do exist in them may be other than those given to our senses, he observes that "the physicist as such has no interest in the intrinsic character or private life of the events in Nature." Quite so: but if this is true of things outside the body, it must also be true of the brain-process—that, too, may have an inner being or "private life" distinct from anything that can be seen with the eyes or felt with the hands; and this is precisely the sensuous stuff to which I refer.[2]

I do not consider that this sensuous stuff actually possesses the secondary qualities which we perceive by its means. It consists of a multitude of fine parts, in a complex spatial and temporal arrangement; and when a whole or "extract" composed of these parts determines a motor reaction (for, being the inner nature of the brain-process, it can do so), it is thereby used as a sign of the thing outside the body to which we react, and causes a secondary quality (or, more exactly, a qualified object) to appear. This account of the origin of secondary qualities agrees closely with Dr. Holt's doctrine in his essay on "Illusory Experience," with the exception that I definitely place the fine parts in the brain, and regard them as projected from it (intentionally, not really) by being used as a sign. It is a pleasure to me to find myself here so nearly in accord with one of Dr. Montague's neo-realist colleagues.

Now this *use of sensuous states as signs of objects* is the function

[1] This hypothesis of a sensuous stuff, distinct from data of awareness and giving rise to them by being used as a sign, is of course a very large assumption—that is, it is a conception strange to most people and which, to be rendered plausible, needs to be worked out in detail and defended against objections. I have dealt with some of its difficulties in my book, *A Theory of Knowledge* (1923); other difficulties I hope to deal with in later articles.

[2] I find Dr. Montague here giving expression to the view which I have always called "panpsychism." By asserting that reality is "psychical" in its nature, I did not mean to say that it is mental, or conscious, or aware; but only that it has an inner being, invisible to the eyes and intangible to the hands, which enables it, when organized into a body, to feel and to perceive. I would gladly abjure forever the use of the word "psychical," with its misleading suggestions of awareness and mentality, and call reality "material" or "real" or anything you please, so long as it is recognized to have a "private life" and to be potentially conscious.

which, in my article, I designated as "meaning" or "intending." It is in a true sense a non-physical function (though dependent, of course, on causality); and is the very essence of cognition. My contention is that this function is covered up and lost sight of in the philosophy of the neo-realists, who try to substitute for it a purely physical relation.[3]

I must now point out how Dr. Montague has misunderstood my theory, through supposing that by the image or sensuous state I mean something which is "before the mind." He says: "The principal difference between Dr. Strong's theory of the cognitive relation and my own theory lies in this—that, if I understand him, he would regard the content or image that figures in veridical perception as numerically non-identical with the existent object, though 'meaning' it; while I should regard the image before the mind in veridical perception and the existent object as numerically identical, but differing in their *causal* context and their *histories*." But the image to which I referred (I was speaking of memory, and held that there is in it a present image, which is projected into the past) is not something "before the mind"—it is not a "content" in this sense. I did not say that we have an image before us, which "means" the object; I said that an image exists in us, as a state of ourselves, and enables *us* to mean the object. The object is thus directly present to us, as a thing meant, and nothing else is present. If my doctrine had been that there is an image before us, which then, by an ulterior relation, means the object, I should have found it difficult indeed to repel the charge of "subjectivism," or (as it is perhaps better to say here) "representationism."[4]

In short, I agree with James that immediate or pure experience is not "double-barrelled"; with Bradley that it "contains no distinction of subject and object." If the image were a "content," in the sense of being "before" (not merely *in*) the mind, there would necessarily be some mind or consciousness distinct from it and contemplating it: but I agree with James in maintaining that consciousness in this sense "does not exist." The only consciousness or awareness I can admit is the function of meaning, by which this

[3] For two examples of this, see Norman Kemp Smith's *Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 7, note.

[4] That the image in memory exists in the present, and is only projected into or referred to the past, seems to me to be proved by the fact that in expectation a precisely similar image is projected into the future. What is before the mind, in these cases, is the past object or the future object, not the present image. Similarly in perception, when I see a bird flying very far away in the sky, what is before my mind is not a very small bird, but a very distant one. It is the meaning of the punctiform image, not the punctiform image itself, that is before the mind; this image is only *in* the mind.

sensuous existent brings before us an existent other than itself. And in this sense I do assert the existence of consciousness, and believe that it remains in spite of James's criticisms.

There is thus a sharp distinction between *sense,* which "contains no antithesis of subject and object," *i.e.,* is not a thing apprehended or, in itself, apprehending, and *awareness,* which is essentially the apprehension of an (existent or non-existent) object. These are two entirely different things, though each of them might seem to have claims to be regarded as the subject-matter of psychology.

One more point, to dispel the last suspicion of there being anything "representationist" or "subjectivist" in my theory. Dr. Montague has devoted a great part of his paper to insisting on the necessary identity, in veridical perception, of existent things with perceived things, and to arguing from the case of conception to that of perception. It never would have occurred to me to make a difference between perception and conception, or to hold that, though the conceived object is directly present to the mind, the perceived object is absent. The thing cognized and the thing that exists are identical in both cases—*when and so far as cognition is veridical;* and that this should be so is, as Dr. Montague rightly says, the fundamental postulate of knowledge. Curiously enough, the purpose of my "Epistle" was to protest that this identity exists on my theory as much as on his. He may object that I have distinguished awareness of the essence of a thing from belief in its existence, and asserted the identity only of the essence given with the essence embodied. At least I added that our belief was directly addressed (in the form of a motor tendency) to the thing itself. But, to remedy any defect in my doctrine here, I wish to say that, as I now see the matter, intuition of essence and belief in existence are only logical aspects of the act of perception, and together compose a single awareness, to which both the existence and the essence of the thing are present. The presence of the existence of the thing to awareness does not, however, guarantee the actual existence of the thing, as Dr. Montague himself admits. Having, by this modification of my doctrine, included existence (presumptive existence) in that of which we are aware, I hope he will allow that, on this point at least, we are now in perfect agreement.

The issue between us that remains concerns, not the object cognized, but the nature of the cognitive relation—the method by which objects are made present to the mind. I have no quarrel with his statement that error consists in the mistaken inclusion of a cognized object in the physical series, except that it seems to me insufficient. I should like to know how the cognized object comes to be thus included, and what is its status (for it can not be a *mere*

subsistent) when the inclusion is erroneous. We need a theory that shall explain non-veridical as well as veridical perception—that shall account for the appearance of objects that do not exist, as in hallucination, the projection of after-images, and doubled vision, and for the appearance of the secondary qualities on Dr. Montague's hypothesis that they do not exist in external things.

He seems to me to have come very near to indicating such a theory, when he says that the existence or non-existence of these qualities externally depends on whether the forms of motion and stress on the surface of bodies exactly resemble the forms of motion and stress in the brain. In other words, for veridical perception the brain must repeat or reproduce within itself the characters of things outside. The cognitive relation, in that case, does not consist in a mere identity of things given with things existent: it is a relation between the organism, or the self in the organism, and outside objects. What we perceive, as constituting the natures of these, is determined by the effects they produce in the brain. But does not this amount to saying that, in perception, events in the brain or states of the self are "projected," and used for picturing things outside, sometimes correctly and sometimes incorrectly? Is not all perception strictly analogous to the projection of after-images?

Thus my theory as to the projective nature of the cognitive function seems to me to be logically contained in Dr. Montague's hypothesis about secondary qualities, and about a "private life" in objects and therefore in the brain-process.

Neo-realists as a rule attach great importance to the reality of secondary qualities, to their being "parts of Nature." They can maintain this, if my theory is correct, only if what they refer to is not the secondary qualities, but the sensuous states in the brain that underlie them. These, however, are not qualities; they are only arrangements of fine parts. The secondary qualities themselves, though objective in their character, and, in perception, presumed to exist in external objects, do not really exist there, but are only appearances. For even on Dr. Montague's hypothesis that there are forms of motion and stress on the surface of bodies exactly resembling those in the brain—a very doubtful hypothesis, when we consider the extreme dissimilarity of cerebral and extra-bodily processes, and the inutility of such a microscopic knowledge of objects—this is only an arrangement of fine parts, and there is no organism here to gather the parts up into a whole and use the whole as a sign, thus causing the appearance of a quality. The secondary qualities, then, are only appearances, conveying some truth about Nature (since they vary with the object) under a veil of symbolism and illusion.

The deployment of these qualities in space, on the other hand—that is, the visible shape, distance, and magnitude of objects—is a respect in which the brain truly copies the relations of things outside it (or at least reproduces them sufficiently for the objectified image to be a vision of them). The appearance here, in Dr. Montague's phrase, "coincides" with the object; or, to use Dr. Holt's simile, awareness is like a "searchlight" that illuminates it. In a word, the object appears, and appears as it is.

Much of neo-realism will still remain true on my theory. There will still be "neutral entities," in the shape of presumptively existent objects, which will be referred to the physical world, and at the same time be episodes in our mental history; these neutral entities will be exactly what they are experienced as being, in the mere experience of them no error will be possible; and, when and so far as the presumption of existence is correct, they will be identical with external objects. What my theory does is not to contradict these propositions of neo-realism, but to provide an environment in which they become intelligible.

Such an environment seems to me to be urgently required, but missing, in the neo-realist philosophy. Thus I notice that Dr. Montague speaks of the image as, on his own theory, something that is "before the mind." What is this "mind," which the image is before? It can not be the image itself. The only other thing, on his principles, that the image can be before is the percipient's body. But his body, on those principles, is simply a group of other images. Can these images, besides being sensuous in their own nature, also be sentient of an image outside the group they form? To suppose this would be to depart from the strict terms of his theory, and move in the direction of mine.

Again, take Dr. Holt's comparison of consciousness to a "searchlight" illuminating objects. A very apt comparison, surely. But if the illumination is inherent in the objects—if each object is simply a sum of visual, tactile, and other images—where is the "searchlight"? Evidently the light should not simply fall on the objects, but proceed from the body. But the train of physical causes and effects underlying cognition runs in the opposite direction. In what, then, does this light consist? It seems to me that only my theory gives an intelligible answer to this question, by saying that cognition is a relation of "meaning" or "intending" between sensuous states inside the body and objects outside.[5]

[5] I do not conceive this relation in any mystical way, or as involving any existent other than those composing the natural world. It is simply the relation that *must* be present, when objects call forth sensuous states in animals and these states cause the animals to react appropriately to the objects.

Let me, in conclusion, briefly restate the issue. Neo-realism appears to hold that seeing, hearing, and touching consist merely in the sensuous existence of things seen, heard, and touched. I maintain that the element of sense they involve does not lie at the objective pole of the cognitive relation, but at the subjective pole; that it is internal to the organism or self, and is the medium by which the self enters into relation with objects. Cognition is essentially a relation of the organism to other things—a relation between two existents. Thus my theory effects a proper separation between things known and the self that knows; yet without dualism, since the self, on this theory, is simply another part of Nature.

C. A. STRONG.

THINGS PERCEIVED AND THINGS PERCEIVING

OR

SUGGESTIONS FOR A NEO-CRITICAL REALISM

DR. STRONG'S paper on "Things Perceived but not Existent" which appears in this number of the JOURNAL as a rejoinder to my paper on "Things Existent and Things Perceived" (printed in No. 12 of the current volume) goes so far to make possible that *rapprochement* between his brand of Critical Realism and my own brand of Neo-Realism, which was the aim of his original "Epistle," that I ask permission to make a brief sur-rejoinder.

The purpose of this reply is two-fold:

I. To confirm our already definite agreement on the *epistemological* theory of Monistic Ojectivism, according to which, in all cases of veridical cognition, perceptual as well as conceptual, the thing cognized and thing existent are not two things with similar essences or qualities, but one and the same thing in two different contexts—an existential context of public and physical relations, and a cognitional context of private and psychical relations;

II. To clarify our as yet indefinite agreements and disagreements on the *psycho-physical* problem as to the nature of what it is that does the cognizing, how it is done, and how these cognizers are related to the physical brain in which they are located.

I do not think we are multiplying distinctions beyond necessity if we differentiate pretty sharply between these two problems which, for want of better terms, I am designating respectively the "epistemological" and the "psycho-physical." There are two reasons for distinguishing these problems. In the first place, the epistemological problem is methodological and capable of being solved by a process of dialectical discussion in which the meanings of ambiguous terms are agreed upon, analyzed, and then applied to the universally recog-

nized aspects of the cognitive situation. The psycho-physical problem, on the other hand, is not dialectical but empirical or trans-empirical, involving questions of fact rather than questions of meaning. It can be solved only tentatively by inferring from the observed facts of physiology and psychology such unobserved and hypothetical agencies as may be necessary to explain them. In the second place, the epistemological problem should be distinguished from the psycho-physical because the former problem of how cognized objects are related to existent objects can be solved in various ways independently of any commitment on the psycho-physical problem of how cognitive processes are related to the brain.

I. The Epistemological Problem

With regard to epistemology there is little that I need say beyond calling attention to Dr. Strong's admission or explanation (for which I am profoundly thankful) that "the thing cognized and the thing that exists are identical in both cases [of conception and of perception] *when and in so far as cognition is veridical.* And that this should be so is, as Dr. Montague rightly says, the fundamental postulate of knowledge. Curiously enough the purpose of my 'Epistle' was to protest that this identity exists on my theory as much as on his. He may object that I have distinguished awareness of the essence of a thing from belief in its existence and asserted the identity only of the essence given with the essence embodied. . . . But to remedy any defect in my doctrine here, I wish to say that, as I now see the matter, intuition of essence and belief in existence are only logical aspects of the act of perception and together compose a single awareness to which both the existence and the essence of the thing are present. Having, by this modification of my doctrine, included existence (presumptive existence) in that of which we are aware, I hope he will allow that, on this point at least, we are now in perfect agreement."

I do allow it, and very gratefully. But I trust that without impairing the cordialty of our *entente* I may make these two comments:

1. The "identity of essence" between the thing existent and the thing perceived, of which Dr. Strong speaks in the first half of the passage just quoted, is a matter of course and hardly relevant to our discussion. It could be admitted by the most dualistic of dualists or "representationists": for "identity of essence" is only another form of words for "perfect similarity" or "copying." The point at issue concerns not the identity of essence, but the identity of existence or position. The older realism contended that the thing that exists as a physical body is in one place, *viz.*, outside the mind and

the organism of the percipient, while the thing that is perceived is in another place, *viz.*, inside the mind and the organism of the percipient. Neo-realism, at least in the form that I hold it, contends that the content or object of a veridical perception is existentially or numerically indentical with the existent object—that they occupy, not different places but the same place, and that that place is outside the organism but directly present to the mind.

2. May I be permitted to learn to what extent Dr. Strong's colleagues among the Critical Realists will sanction the objectivistic monism in epistemology to which he now subscribes? I ask this because, since receiving Dr. Strong's "Epistle," I have read Professor Lovejoy's *Howison Lecture* and Mr. Santayana's chapter on "The Cognitive Claims of Memory" in his *Scepticism and Animal Faith;* and it seemed to me that these two writings constituted the most persuasive arguments *against* epistemological monism and in favor of epistemological dualism or representationism that I had ever read.

II. The Psycho-Physical Problem

The major problem attacked by the New Realists was what I have called in the preceding section of this paper the "Epistemological Problem"; and with respect to that problem the solution unanimously agreed to can, according to my understanding of it, be stated as follows: I. As *realists* we maintained that the world of physical events in space and time existed in its own right independently of whether it was or was not apprehended by any knowers finite or absolute; II. As "new" realists, we claimed further, (1) that abstract forms, essences, possibilities and their relations—sometimes called the realm of "subsistence"—enjoyed the same objective status and the same independence of whether or not they were cognized as the world of concrete existence, and (2) that both existent and subsistent objects were themselves directly *presented* to the knower as content of his consciousness. In short, American New Realism was (I) ordinary realism and, (II) a supplementary doctrine consisting of (1) Plato's theory of the independent objectivity of the abstract, and (2) Reid's substitution of a common-sense *presentative* theory of cognition for the *representative* theory of Descartes and Locke.

When the New Realists turned from their primary interest in the epistemological problem as to the status of objects known with respect to the knowing of them, to their secondary interest in the psycho-physical problem as to the nature of the knowing process itself and its relation to the brain, then agreement ceased and disagreement began.

As an example of one such disagreement, I find myself unable to accept the behavioristic theory of Perry and Holt that cognition is just a "specific response" of the organism to the object cognized. I can not understand how any mere motion of nerve-currents through the body could give that presentation of qualities, relations, and spatio-temporally distant events which constitutes our experience or consciousness of objects.

Now Dr. Strong, by taking what I can not but suspect is a considerable step to the "left" of orthodox Critical Realism, has met me in the matter of epistemological monism. And I can meet him in the matter of psycho-physical dualism by taking a similar step to the "right" of orthodox New Realism. The double measure of agreement which we seem to have achieved may perhaps be stated as follows:

1. Independently existent and subsistent objects can without prejudice to their independence present themselves as content of consciousness.

2. This direct cognition of extra-organic objects can occur, however, only through the agency of intra-organic states, which Dr. Strong calls "images" and which are "psychical" in the sense that regardless of what their ultimate nature may turn out to be, they are not just the physical particles or motions which alone would be recognized by the chemist or physiologist.

3. These *images* are "in the mind" and not "before the mind." but they reveal as their "meanings" or "implicates" *objects* that are "before the mind" and not "in the mind."

4. The *images* are the indirect results of actually existent things which at various places and times produced by their action upon the sense-organs of the individual effects which are modified, retained, and organized in the cerebrum.

5. The *objects* revealed, meant, or implied by the *images* may or may not coincide in quality, place, and date with the independently real objects which they appear to be. To the extent that they do so coincide we have *truth,* to the extent that they do not we have *error.*

6. Whether an experience of existent objects is in any aspect (1) erroneous, or (2) truthful, depends on whether the images or ultimate effects in the brain—which are the proximate determiners of what appears—(1) have or (2) have not undergone an *uncorrected distortion* in the long and indirect process of their genesis; and whether an experience is erroneous or truthful can only be discovered empirically by comparing it with other experiences.

I hope that I have not over-stated or mis-stated the points on

which Dr. Strong and I would seem to be in agreement. And in conclusion I should like to enumerate with a view to further clarification the points on which we seem unfortunately to be not yet in agreement.

1. As to the relation of "meaning" or "implication" which obtains between the perceiving images and the perceived objects:

(*a*) Dr. Strong appears to be at one with Alexander and the British realists in the view that this relation of *awareness* neither requires nor permits any further analysis, or any explanation of its association with the purely physiological and observable processes of living matter. The *thing perceiving* just "means" the *thing perceived*. And the transphysical "compresence" of a conscious organism with the spatio-temporally remote events which are its objects is not a mystery, but a mere brute fact.

(*b*) In contrast to this view, it seems to me that it is both desirable and possible to analyze this "compresence" of the percipient with the perceived and to explain it by the categories of physical science. I have tried on several occasions—most recently in a paper in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* for 1920—to show that this explanation can be given by regarding what Dr. Strong calls "images" as aspects of that potential energy which is the only case and a sufficient case of spatio-temporal events being vicariously present in a place and time other than their own.

2. As to the relation of the mind to the brain: (*a*) To Dr. Strong it appears that the "existent images" or "sensuous stuff" of the perceiving mind "consists of a multitude of fine parts in a complex spatial and temporal arrangement." The mind as thus conceived is the "inner being" or "private life" of the brain process, and by implication subject to the same mechanistic laws and final disintegration as the brain itself.

(*b*) In opposition to this "mechanistic psychism" I incline to a "hylistic vitalism" according to which the mind as inferred from the values, unities, and durations revealed in its experience must be conceived as an entity separable from the brain in which it develops. In short, I believe in *souls*. But as a mitigating (or is it an aggravating?) circumstance, I hold with the Pre-Cartesian and primitive animist that it is possible to explain these souls in physical terms.

There is a chance, though a slender one, that in these matters of speculative psycho-physics Dr. Strong and I may achieve the same measure of agreement as that which we seem to have already attained in the more purely dialectical problems of epistemology.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Social Psychology. F. H. ALLPORT. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924. Pp. xiv + 453.

Based on the latest scientific research and covering in a refreshingly objective manner a field hitherto characterized by much superficiality, this volume makes a near approach to the ideal textbook. Suggestive and stimulative, it merits a more extended critical review than can here be given it.

Social psychology, according to the author's conception of it, is the science of socially stimulated individual behavior, and of the consciousness accompanying such behavior, "in so far as it is consciousness of social objects and social relations." Following Ross, Allport distinguishes social psychology from sociology on the ground that the former deals with individuals in the group while the latter treats of groups as wholes—a distinction which may prove to be neither definite nor true.

More important than definition, however, is point of view. Allport's analysis is, in the main, behavioristic and mechanistic. The fallacy of the group mind is given the short shrift appropriate to a piece of mysticism which has served more than one prominent writer as cover to loose thinking. The sooner we see that the only behavior there is is the behavior of individuals, the better it will be for all the social sciences.

Yet behaviorists will criticize the author adversely for clinging to the consciousness concept and for relying, on occasion, upon introspection for evidence. He does not regard consciousness as a causal link in behavior, but is it difficult to see how he can avoid so doing; and behaviorists may ask why bother with consciousness if it is not a link in the mechanistic chain? The term "social consciousness" is also admitted, but is defined as the individual consciousness accompanying social attitudes—a concept very different from the tranditional analogical use of the term.

Whatever lease of life may be granted consciousness and introspection, instincts are pitched into the discard. "Prepotent reflexes," which take their place, look at first glance like instincts under another name, but they are not. While they are in a sense final, in that they are organically inherited, they have none of that mysteriousness associated with instincts. The mechanism of a reflex can be worked out; that of an instinct can not.

The author devotes an early chapter to the physiology of the nervous system, a chapter which seems out of place in a text on social psychology until we remember how essential it is for the student to have freshly in mind the mechanism of chain, circular, and condi-

tioned reflexes. The conditioning of reflexes appears as the main part of the learning process, which in its turn is the mechanism for the development of personality. Provided we take pains to analyze the mechanism, we have here a thought which should be of profound import for the development of a scientific sociology. But Allport is in error when he says that "only recently have we recognized the importance of early influences . . . in the formation of lifelong attitudes." The Jesuits knew this two centuries ago, and psychologists like Baldwin and sociologists like Cooley have dwelt upon it. If we have forgotten that "as the twig is bent so is the tree inclined," it is because we have not been sufficiently critical of the sociological dogmatisms of the biologists, the "racialists," and the eugenists. Popularly impressed with their parade of statistical erudition and their prophetical lamentations, we have simply let it slip our mind that the real birth of a human person is a long and sometimes painful process which comes a long time after, rather than precedes, the physical birth. Happily such books as this call us back to a saner and a fairer view.

The discussion of sympathy, imitation, and suggestion marks a noteworthy advance on what sociologists like Tarde and Ross have hitherto served out to us on these matters. McDougall's "sympathetic induction" theory is rejected on grounds which appear conclusive. When the mechanism of imitation is analyzed, imitation itself disappears, a practically useless concept. Suggestion is in part explained as due to "social facilitation," but the mechanism of this phenomenon (which is established as a fact by laboratory tests) is not very satisfactorily explained. Rivalry is held to have much the same stimulative effect as the mere presence of others, but the laboratory evidence is perhaps not conclusive for actual social conditions. The author is clearly wrong in holding that rivalry can not be employed to improve quality of output. The literature of industrial management contains too much which indicates the contrary, for instance, the remarkable achievements of R. B. Wolf in the paper-making industry. And can anyone seriously think that rivalry has no influence on the quality of scientific research, literary creation, or artistic expression?

The treatment of crowd psychology leaves little to be desired. Its bearing on public opinion and its control is as important as it is evident.

The chapter on social adjustments likewise furnishes much food for thought, but also some matters on which question should be raised. The problem of adjustment is regarded as one of conflict between the individual's socialized drives and his more primitive, unsocialized impulses. An old and familiar problem of morals is thus stated in

new psychological terms. But the statement does not cover the whole problem of adjustment. The individual frequently has to face the problem of adjusting the conflict of two socialized drives. It is doubtful whether, as soon as we leave the field of child psychology, and that of the defective and criminal, unsocialized drives play so important a part in the drama of conflict. To be sure, all psychological conflicts may be traced back to the subfoundation of prepotent reflexes, and to repression or suppression somewhere, but a highly socialized drive may suffer repression just as truly as may a primitive impulse. Despite his critical attitude toward the Freudians, it is possible that the author has, in this matter of adjustment, been unduly influenced by the Freudian point of view. So, too, question may be raised as to the balance and validity of the doctrine which makes inferiority complexes the key to the explanation of the radical attitude. The author at this point very nearly involves himself in circular reasoning.

In general, it may be said that the last two chapters, on social adjustments and social behavior in relation to society, in which social psychology is brought to bear on sociological phenomena and problems, are less satisfactory than the rest of the book. Here the author becomes somewhat eclectic and less critical. The mechanistic point of view is less clearly maintained. And the treatment is of a far more summary nature that the matter deserves. For the sake of fuller discussion here the author would have done well to omit the chapter on the measurement of personality, and those on language and gesture, and facial and bodily expression. However high, technically, their interest may be, they add little to the logical unity of the book, and their utility is not at once apparent.

It is to be regretted that some matters of prime interest are not discussed at all. The desire for recognition and for distinction deserves some attention, as does also the influence of the "respectability" motive. A more regrettable omission is that of any extended discussion of the psychology and the social import of sentiment. The word is not in the index.

The book nevertheless remains a most notable addition to the literature of its subject.

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Psychology and Primitive Culture. F. C. BARTLETT. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1923. Pp. 293.

The task which the author has set for himself is that of explaining primitive culture in the light of the present-day psychological conception of motivation. Beginning with McDougall's list of in-

stincts in his *Introduction to Social Psychology*, which he analyzes critically, he concludes that there are "three forms of fundamental social relationship: . . . the tendency to primitive comradeship—a relationship of equals—and the tendencies of assertiveness and submissiveness, or of dominance and acceptance—a relationship of superiors and inferiors." In addition to these principal tendencies there are also "group difference tendencies or specific tendencies which cluster about various forms of institution."

In an extended discussion the author attempts to show how the folk-story can be interpreted as a manifestation of the tendencies, the instinctive forms of social relationship, comradeship, assertiveness, and submissiveness. The folk tales dealt with are chiefly those of the Ba-ila as reported by Smith and Dale and of the Indians of the North Pacific coast as reported by Boas.

Peculiarly interesting is the author's point of view in regard to the origin of folk tales. He considers Boas' view as speculative and states, it seems somewhat patronizingly, that he, Boas, may be and probably is correct while his own position "is clearer and simpler." His "clearer and simpler" position is that "the tendencies clustering about the institutions are reflected in the stories, and from the point of view of the study of the formative influences of the tales, and of their effect upon listeners, they may legitimately be taken as starting-points for analysis."

In the chapters dealing with the contact of peoples, the transmission of culture by borrowing, and the diffusion of culture, the tendencies by which primitive culture was to be explained are less often appealed to and the discussion becomes proportionately lucid.

Considered as a whole, the book can not be commended either as a contribution to social psychology or to ethnology; from the viewpoint of either science it is unconvincing.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

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NOTES AND NEWS

Professor Anathon A. Aall of the University of Kristiania, Norway, has come to Columbia University as Visiting Professor of Philosophy for the academic year, 1924–25. He is lecturing on the Influence of Hellenism on Christianity, on Social Psychology, and on Nietzsche.

We have received the following notice concerning the Commemorative Exercises for Dr. G. Stanley Hall:

To the Alumni of Clark University and the friends of Dr. Hall:

With the purpose of making the Commemoration of the life and work of Dr. Hall a perpetual memorial, the University has postponed all formal exercises until Founder's Day, Feruary 1–3, 1925, intending that from then on the material and spiritual founders of the University shall be remembered together.

February 1st, next year, falls upon Sunday and the usual Founder's Day exercises will be held on Monday, the 2nd. The Commemoration for Dr. Hall will, however, be threefold.

On the afternoon of Sunday, February 1st, there will be a commemorative meeting of a somewhat personal character at which addresses will be delivered by leading Alumni of the University and others whose relations with Dr. Hall were intimate. At this session there will, of course, be appropriate music, and letters will be read from friends and former pupils who are not able to be present.

The usual Founder's Day convocation of the University will be held on Monday morning with an address by some one competent to speak particularly of Dr. Hall's work as a university president and patron of research.

The third part of the Commemoration will consist of a brief scientific conference upon Genetic Psychology, with sessions on Monday afternoon and evening and on Tuesday morning. The Committee has felt that, in view of Dr. Hall's unquenchable vitality and devotion to science, nothing could be arranged that would have given him greater satisfaction than a gathering of those working in the line of his own chief interest, Genetic Psychology, with the purpose of discussing progress already made and the future of this branch of science. As you are perhaps aware, Dr. Hall left to the University, as an endowment for research in Genetic Psychology, the "residue" of his estate, which will probably amount to $150,000 or more. We are planning, therefore, to ask to participate in the conference those of the Alumni of the institution who are actively engaged in research in Genetic Psychology, which we understand to mean in the first instance Child Study, but to include also Development in the Animal Series (Comparative Psychology), Anthropology, and all other psychological studies by the genetic method in the widest acceptation of that term. It is desired that as many as possible of the Alumni and others interested should be present, not only for the sessions of Sunday and Monday, but also for this third part of the Commemoration.

It is hoped that the proceedings at all three sessions will later be published in full.

EDMUND C. SANFORD,
WILLIAM H. BURNHAM,
Committee on the Commemoration.